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THE THIRD UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE
ON THE LAW OF THE SEA: THE 1974
CARACAS SESSION *
By John R1. Stevenson and Bernard H. Oxnan*
INTRODUCTION
Will there be a timely and successful conclusion to the Law of the Sea
Conference? This is the basic question governments and interested mem-
bers of the public are considering as they review the results of the or-
ganizational session of the Conference at UN Headquarters in New York
from December 3 to December 15, 1973, and the first substantive session
in Caracas from June 20 to August 29, 1974. During this review they face
ever more pressing problems arising from the strategic, economic, scientific,
and environmental use and importance of the oceans and ocean resources,
intensified by growing concern with international trade and with supplies
and prices of food and basic raw materials.
The object of the Law of the Sea Conference is a comprehensive Law
of the Sea Treaty. While this was not achieved, the Caracas session ac-
complished a great deal: the foundations and building blocks of a settle-
ment are now all present in usable form. A treaty can be achieved if
negotiation among delegates authorized to reach an accommodation on
critical issues takes place without delay.
Two underlying problems affect the evaluation of the Caracas session.
First, events beyond the control of the Conference are tempting states to
take matters into their own hands. Thus, progress must be measured
against the real possibility that the Conference may be overtaken by events.
Second, the Conference suffers from the carryover of a negotiating style
more suitable for General Assembly recommendations or negotiation of
abstract issues than for texts intended to become widely accepted as treaty
obligations affecting immediate interests of states in a dynamic situation.
Tactics, rather than negotiation, were the rule. Thus, the real potential
for accommodation is not as evident in the public record as it might be.
Accomplishments of the session were considerable. Among the most
important are the following:
(a) The vast array of traditional Law of the Sea issues and proposals
which fall within the mandate of Committee II was organized by the
* This article is a sequel to Stevenson and Oxman, The Preparations for the Law of
the Sea Conference, 68 AJIL 1 (1974). The views expressed herein are those of the
authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the Department of State or the
U.S. Government.
*0 Of the Board of Editors. Ambassador, Special Representative of the President
for the Law of the Sea Conference.
*** Assistant Legal Adviser for Oceans, Environment and Scientific Affairs, U.S.
Department of State.
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Committee into a comprehensive set of informal working papers reflecting
main trends on each precise issue. New proposals and trends may of
course appear in the course of efforts to achieve an accommodation on
various issues. The large number of formal proposals were mainly intro-
duced as a basis for insertions in these informal working papers. All
states can now focus on each issue, and the alternative solutions, with
relative ease in a consolidated text.' A similar development occurred with
respect to marine scientific research 2 and in part with respect to preserva-
tion of the marine environment 3 in Committee III.
(b) The transition from the UN Seabed Committee of about 90 to a
Conference of almost 150 was achieved without major new stumbling
blocks and a minimum of delay.
(c) The overwhelming majority clearly desires a treaty in the near
future. Agreement on the Rules of Procedure 4 by consensus is clear evi-
dence of this desire to achieve a widely-acceptable treaty. The tone of the
general debate and the informal meetings was moderate and serious. The
Conference adopted a recommended 1975 work schedule deliberately de-
vised to stimulate agreement.
(d) The inclusion in the treaty of a 12-mile territorial sea and a 200-
mile economic zone was all but formally agreed, subject of course to ac-
ceptable resolution of other issues, including unimpeded transit of straits.
Accordingly, expanded coastal state jurisdiction over living and nonliving
resources appears assured as part of the comprehensive treaty.
(e) With respect to the deep seabeds, the first steps have been taken
toward real negotiation of the basic questions of the system and condi-
tions of exploitation.
(f) Traditional regional and political alignments of states are being re-
placed by informal groups whose membership is based on similarities of
interest on a particular issue. This has greatly facilitated clarification of
issues, and is necessary for finding effective accommodations.
(g) The number and tempo of private meetings has increased con-
siderably, and moved beyond formal positions. This is essential to a
successful negotiation.
With few exceptions, the Conference papers now make clear the struc-
ture and general content of the treaty, the alternatives to choose from, the
blanks to be filled in, and even the relative importance attached to dif-
ferent issues. What was missing in Caracas was sufficient political will
to make hard negotiating choices. The main reason was the conviction
that this would not be the last session and that it was not necessary to
take those difficult decisions yet. This, in turn, was related to the problem
of resolving diverse issues, to which different states may attach differing
importance, as a "package" and unwillingness to move in some areas with-
out concurrent movement in others. Nevertheless, the words "we are not
far apart" were more and more frequently heard.
IA/CONF.62/C 2/WP.1. 2 A/CONF.62/C.3/L.17.
3 A/CONF.62/C.3/L.15. 4 A/CONF.62/30/Rev.1.
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The Conference has recommended to the UN General Assembly that
the next session be held in Geneva from March 17 to May 10, 1975. The
Conference also agreed to recommend that the formal final session of the
Conference should be held in Caracas for the purpose of signature of the
final act and other instruments of the Conference.
ORGANIZATION
The Conference organized itself along the model of the UN Seabed
Committee. Ambassador Hamilton Shirley Amerasinghe of Sri Lanka,
formerly Chairman of the Seabed Committee, was elected President of the
Conference. There are three main committees of the whole.
The First Committee is concerned with the international regime and
machinery for the seabed beyond the limits of national jurisdiction, usually
referred to as the "international area" or the deep seabeds. It established
a working group, and later in the session a negotiating group with closed
meetings. The Committee was chaired by Paul Bamela Engo of Cameroon,
and the working group and negotiating group by Christopher Pinto of Sri
Lanka. Both served in similar capacities in the Seabed Committee.
The Second Committee has the broadest and most complex mandate,
embracing virtually all of the traditional Law of the Sea subjects. These
include issues regarding the territorial sea, straits, archipelagos, the high
seas, the economic zone, including living and nonliving resources, the
continental shelf, and access to the sea. The Committee was chaired by
Ambassador Andres Aguilar of Venezuela, who also chaired its informal
sessions.
The Third Committee is concerned with pollution and with scientific
research and transfer of technology. Ambassador A. Yankov of Bulgaria
was elected Chairman. Informal sessions on pollution were held, with Mr.
Jose Vallarta of Mexico serving as chairman. Mr. Vallarta served in this
capacity in the Seabed Committee as well. Mr. Cornel Metternich of
the Federal Republic of Germany was elected chairman of the informal
sessions on scientific research and transfer of technology.
A Drafting Committee of 23 members was elected, under the chairman-
ship of Ambassador Alan Beesely of Canada. A Credentials Committee of
9 members was elected under the chairmanship of Mr. Heinrich Gleissner
of Austria. The General Committee of the Conference consists of the 48
officers of the Conference and its main committees.
The most difficult issue regarding the organization of work concerned
the problem of voting. The underlying problem is one of reconciling the
interests in ensuring that a treaty widely acceptable among all groups of
states is produced with the need to accomplish this within a reasonable
time. The resolution of the General Assembly calling the Conference 5
was accompanied by a "gentleman's agreement" to the effect that the
Conference should proceed on the basis of consensus as far as possible.
5 UN G.A. Res. 3067(XXVJII), Nov. 16, 1973.
6 Appendix to Rules of Procedure, note 4 supra.
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The rules of procedure adopted by the Conference by consensus in-
clude reaffirmation of the "gentleman's agreement," and provisions re-
quiring a delay in a vote on substance in plenary and in committee for a
specified period, after which a determination must be made that all efforts
at consensus have been exhausted., The traditional rule that texts require
a majority vote in committee and a two-thirds vote in plenary of states
"present and voting" contains an added qualifieation that the two-thirds
majority in plenary must also constitute a majority of states participating
in that session of the Conference.9
7For further discussion of the consensus rule, see Daniel Vignes, Will the Third
Conference on the Law of the Sea Work According to the Consensus RuleP infra p.
119. The "gentlemen's agreement" is quoted at p. 124, note 16.
8 Rule 37 of the Rules of Procedure, Note 4 supra, provides as follows:
Rule 37
1. Before a matter of substance is put to the vote, a determination that all
efforts at reaching general agreement have been exhausted shall be made by the
majority specified in paragraph 1 of rule 39.
2. Prior to making such a determination the following procedures may be in-
voked:(a) When a matter of substance comes up for voting for the first time, the
President may and shall if requested by at least 15 representatives, defer the
question of tafdng a vote on such matter for a period not exceeding 10 calendar
days. The provisions of this subparagraph may be applied only once on the matter.(b) At any time the Conference, upon a proposal by the President or upon
motion by any representative, may decide, by a majority of the representatives
present and voting, to defer the question of taking a vote on any matter of sub-
stance for a specified period of time.(c) During any period of deferment, the President shall make every effort with
the assistance as appropriate of the General Committee, to facilitate the achieve-
ment of general agreement, having regard to the over-all progress made on all
matters of substance which are closely related and a report shall be made to theConference by the President prior to the end o? the period.
(d) If by the end of a specified period of deferment the Conference has not
reached agreement and if the question of taking a vote is not further deferred in
accordance with subparagraph (b) of this paragraph, the determination that all
efforts at reaching general agreement have been exhausted shall be made in ac-
cordance with paragraph 1 of this rule.
(e) If the Conference has not determined that all efforts at reaching agree-
ment had been exhaustced, the President may propose or any representative may
move, notwithstanding rule 36, after the end of a period of no less than five
calendar days from the last prior vote on such a determination that such a deter-
muination be made in accordance with paragraph 1 of this rule; the requirement
of five days' delay shall not apply during the last two weeks of a session.
3. No vote shall be taken on any matter of substance less than two working
days after an announcement that the Conference is to proceed to vote on the
matter has been made, during which period the announcement shall be published
in the Journal at the first opportunity.
Rule 55 applies rule 37 "to the proceedings of committees and subsidiary bodies, ex-
cept that:...
(d) Rule 37 shall be applied to the Main Committees, provided that a deter-
mination pursuant to paragraph 1 shall require a majority of the representatives
present and voting, the deferment of the question of taking a vote by the Chair-
man of the Committee in conformity with subparagraph 2(a) shall not exceed
five calendar days and the assistance specified in subparagraph 2(c) shall be
rendered the Chairman by the officers of the Committee.
9 Rule 39, paragraph 1, which also applies under rule 37, provides:
Decisions of the Conference on all matters of substance, including the adoption
of the text of the Convention on the Law of the Sea as a whole, shall be taken by
a two-thirds majority of the representatives present and voting, provided that such
majority shall include at least a majority of the States participating in that session
of the Conference.
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Many delegations regarded the psychological significance of the nego-
tiations on the rules of procedure as of at least as much importance as
the practical significance of the rules themselves. The question was
whether those normally well placed to wield voting majorities in UN
forums, and those that have traditionally favored consensus procedures,
would in effect indicate a mutual intention to negotiate in good faith
within a reasonable time period by accepting certain procedures encourag-
ing such negotiation. In more immediate terms, this was translated into
the question whether a consensus could be reached on the rules of pro-
cedure within the one-week deadline fixed for this purpose for the Caracas
session. This was accomplished.
After agreement on the rules of procedure, the plenary heard general
debate statements under guidelines which emphasized interventions from
states which did not participate in the Seabed Committee. This took
about two weeks. The general debate of the Conference is now concluded.
The work of the Conference was concentrated thereafter in its main com-
mittees, and in particular, in their working groups and informal sessions,
where the most time was spent. There were normally three simultaneous
meetings in the morning and afternoon, usually accompanied by early
morning or night meetings of regional and other groups and some official
night sessions, and extensive informal contact during all available hours.
Of the speculations proffered on the failure to achieve a treaty at Caracas,
the suggestion that many delegations did not work hard reveals the least
familiarity with what in fact took place during those ten weeks.
While not part of its formal organization, regional and other groups play
an important role in the Conference. It is difficult to determine when
a pattern of consultations among states becomes a group, but some at least
might be mentioned.
The Conference inherited from the United Nations its regional groups:
African, Asian, Eastern European, Latin American, Western European and
Others. It also inherited the so-called "Group of 77," principally the de-
veloping countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America, now numbering more
than 100. Some subregional meetings also occurred, for example among
Arab states and among members of the European Economic Community.
Landlocked and other "geographically disadvantaged" states consult with
each other frequently. Meetings among maritime states occur. A "coastal
state group" tends to consult frequently, and some of its participants co-
sponsored a wide-ranging comprehensive proposal mainly on Committee
Rule 40 contains the following definitions:
1. For the purpose of these rules, the phrase 'representatives present and
voting" means representatives present and casting an affirmative or negative vote;
representatives who abstain from voting shall be considered as not voting.
2. Subject to the provisions of rules 1 to 5 and without prejudice to the powers
and functions of the Credentials Committee, the term "States participating" in
relation to any particular session of the Conference means any State whose repre-
sentatives have registered with the Secretariat of the Conference as participating
in that session and which has not subsequently notified the Secretariat of its with-
drawal from that session or a part of it. The Secretariat shall keep a Register
for this purpose.
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I issues1 States interested in dispute settlement have consulted together,
and some participants cosponsored a working paper on this issue."1 An
interesting characteristic of these groups is that they are organized on a
substantive, rather than regional, basis.
Groups can and do have both affirmative and negative potential. To
the extent that they reflect true similarities of interest, they can be used to
iron out minor differences and to reduce and simplify the alternatives. To
the extent that they reflect a desire for political or geographic harmony,
they can perhaps more easily encourage accommodations that will work
generally. But groups can also be divisive or invite rigidity, particularly
when they have worked out delicate internal compromises that leave little
flexibility for negotiation with others, or when the majority in effect gives
its proxy to a vocal and purposeful minority.
THE FIRST COMMITTEE
The very nature of the First Committee's mandate invites excitement: to
construct a new international regime to give content to a new concept, "the
common heritage of mankind." 12 On an ideological or political level, it
invites attempts to implement visions of a more perfect international com-
munity. On an economic level, it invites approaches based on producer
or consumer interests, or relative technological capability, that become en-
tangled with the political and ideological issues. The result is a broad
policy dispute that frequently seems to bear little relation to the immedi-
ate economic object of the effort: manganese nodules on the deep ocean
floor that have yet to be commercially exploited.
One delegation described the proposals of another as "archaic." An-
other delegation felt it necessary to point out that the past evils of co-
lonialism could not be compensated from the deep seabed. One view is
that the policy debate in fact derives from very real differences in eco-
nomic interest, but has been conceptualized as a tactic. Another is that
the majority of states, having realized that manganese nodules are not an
international "pot of gold," feel freer to concentrate more on political and
ideological issues in Committee I, including what might be termed eco-
nomic ideology. The two observations are not mutually inconsistent.
It is interesting that fundamental questions regarding the legal regime
applicable to virtually all seabed petroleum seem closer to resolution in
Committee II than fundamental questions regarding deep seabed manga-
nese nodules in Committee I. Or so it appears on the surface. A third
interpretation of events in Committee I is that a number of delegations did
not see any point in Committee I's moving too far ahead of the other Com-
mittees, particularly in light of widespread talk of an overall package
settlement. Thus, in this view, the Caracas session could best be devoted
to in-depth probing of precise issues in Committee I. Whatever the rea-
to A/CONF.62/L.4. U A/CONF.62/L.7.
12 For fu-ther discussion on this issue, see A. 0. Adede, The System for Exploita-
tion of the "Common Heritage of Mankind" at the Caracas Conference, infra p. 31.
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son, such probing in fact occurred, and it is in this connection that signs
of possible accommodation began to emerge.
Unlike other Committees, virtually the entire range of issues under Com-
mittee I's mandate had been reflected in alternative treaty articles pre-
pared by the Seabed Committee. The one exception was the preparation
of treaty articles on rules and regulations for deep seabed mining. In
previous sessions of the Seabed Committee, which worked on the basis
of consensus, there had been considerable opposition to discussion of rules
and regulations.
The Committee held one week of general debate. A number of African
and Asian delegations expressed their willingness to support an exploita-
tion system that permitted different types of contractual arrangements in
the early years of operation, coupled with a gradual phasing out of these
systems in favor of direct exploitation by the Seabed Authority. In this
connection, the need to provide security of tenure and conditions that
would attract entities with the necessary capital and technology was a
prevalent theme in their statements. There was increased support among
European delegations for a parallel licensing/direct exploitation system;
Australia and Canada maintained their support for this approach. The
United States and others emphasized the need for nondiscriminatory access
and a stable investment climate that does not inhibit exploration and de-
velopment of seabed minerals. A large number of developing country
and other delegations referred to the need to include dispute settlement
machinery in the Authority.
The general debate was followed by a rapid reading of the regime ar-
ticles prepared in the Seabed Committee in an informal committee of the
whole. There were some reductions in alternatives and bracketed lan-
guage on several articles. The majority received no alteration.' s The in-
formal committee decided to discuss in detail major issues of disagreement
rather than proceed to the texts on the international machinery. The three
major issues selected were the exploitation system (Article 9 of the regime),
conditions of exploitation (rules and regulations) and economic implications.
The exploitation system (Article 9) was identified by many countries
as the crux of the Committee I negotiations.
During the Caracas session, the Group of 77 agreed on a single text for
Article 9 (reflected in Alternative B below) which would permit the Au-
thority to enter into a variety of legal arrangements, provided it maintained
"direct and effective control at all times."
The alternatives under consideration were as follows:
Article 9
WHO MAY EXPLOIT THE APEA
(A)
All exploration and exploitation activities in the Area shall be con-
ducted by a Contracting Party or group of Contracting Parties or
is Draft Articles Considered by the Committee at its Informal Meetings (Articles
1-21), A/CONF.62/C.1/L.3.
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natural or juridical persons under its or their authority or sponsorship,
subject to regulation by the Authority and in accordance with the
rules regarding exploration and exploitation set out in these articles.
oR(B)
All activities of exploration of the Area and of the exploitation of
its resources and all other related activities including those of scien-
tific research shall be conducted directly by the Authority.
The Authority may, if it considers it appropriate, and within the
limits it may determine, confer certain tasks to juridical or natural
persons, through service contracts, or association or through any other
such means it may determine which ensure its direct and effective
control at all times over such activities.
Oi (C)
All activities of exploration and exploitation in the Area shall be
conducted in accordance with legal arrangements with the Authority
pursuant to this convention, regulations included in this convention and
those promulgated by the Authority pursuant to this convention.
The Authority shall enter into legal arrangements for exploration
and exploitation with Contracting Parties, groups of Contracting Par-
ties and natural or juridical persons sponsored by such Parties, with-
out discrimination. Such Parties or persons shall comply with this
convention, regulations included in this convention and those promul-
gated by the Authority pursuant to this convention.
OR(D)
All exploration and exploitation activities in the Area shall be con-
ducted by a Contracting Party 'or group of Contracting Parties or
natural or juridical persons under its or their authority or sponsorship,
subject to regulation 14 by the Authority and in accordance with the
rules regarding exploration and exploitation set out in these articles.
The Authority may decide, within the limits of its financial and tech-
nological resources, to conduct such activities.
Note (1) The Committee will have to consider whether to set out
here, as is done in some proposals, the general rules regarding resource
activities in the Area. These could include, inter alia, according to
the type of administration adopted as regards exploration and ex-
ploitation, rules on: notice to mariners and other safety procedures,
areas to be allotted, work requirements, work plans, inspection, service
contracts, licensing, joint ventures, fees payable, revocation of service
contracts, revocation of licenses and integrity of investments. On the
other hand, the Committee may decide to omit them from part I of
the articles.
Several delegations indicated a willingness to discnss formulas which
might include the concept that the Authority's control over resource ex-
14 Footnote 7 of the text, id. at 9, appears here and reads as follows: "The view was
expressed that the word 'regulation' in this context should be replaced by the word
'supervision."'
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ploitation would be exercised in accordance with certain broad general
principles to be laid down in the Convention.
Jamaica introduced a proposal for Article 9 that includes such general
principles, together with the requirement that the Authority promulgate
rules and regulations within this framework. 1- While the Jamaican pro-
posal was not extensively debated in form, the discussions in fact con-
centrated on the precise issues raised by that proposal. In general it would
be fair to conclude that the debate over Article 9 has proceeded beyond
the generalized concepts of the Article 9 texts, and that the real issues
are in fact accurately enumerated in the Jamaican proposal. Some at least
might interpret the unusually strong negative reaction of land-based pro-
ducers to the Jamaican proposal as an indication that paragraph 2(e)16
is for them the crux of the matter.
The essential problem is that all of the proposals say little if anything
about how the mining system would in fact work. Thus, states would
have to ratify the treaty without having a clear idea of what they were
accepting. There would be no guarantee that the interests of any state or
group would be adequately protected in the relevant decisions of the Au-
thority. In particular, the essential interest of consumers in assuring that
exploitation does take place and that the minerals are freely available on
the market without artificial restraint or price-fixing is not protected if
there is no assurance that the conditions of exploitation are workable. It
has been argued that since the vast majority of states are direct or ultimate
consumers of the metals involved, leaving these matters to the Authority is
not prejudicial. However, the political power of the land-based producers
within the Group of 77 in this negotiation, and the absence of more vigorous
and widespread assertion of consumer interests at the Special Session of the
UN General Assembly in the spring of 1974, would indicate the opposite.
The draft text on basic conditions of exploitation that emerged from the
Group of 77 was for the most part an elaboration of their proposal on
Article 9, granting almost complete discretion to the Authority in very gen-
eral terms to make decisions concerning exploitation, so as to give the
Authority "direct and effective control" over all operators.' 7 In certain
areas it described in greater detail how the Authority should maintain
control and sprinkled throughout were the seeds of ideas that might be
converted into treaty articles to protect investment.
In addition to the Group of 77 proposal on basic conditions, draft rules
and regulations were submitted to Committee I by the United States, 8
15 Id. at 19. Quoted in full infra p. 38.
16 Paragraph 2(e) reads:
2. Regulations promulgated pursuant to paragraph 1 of this article shall include
adequate provisions for: ...
(e) the assurance to consuming countries, on a non-discriminatory basis, of
adequate supplies at reasonable prices of the products arising from the explora-
tion and exploitation of the Area and its resources, due regard being paid to the
availability on fair and equitable terms of similar or competitive land-based
products.
17 A/CONF.62/C.I/L.7. 18 A/CONF.62/C.1/L.6.
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by Japan,1" and by eight members of the European Community." The
U.S. draft rules are a detailed compilation of the conditions of exploitation.
They deal with the size of mine sites, the acquisition and duration of ex-
ploration and exploitation rights, work requirements, certification of finan-
cial and technical responsibility, and other basic conditions of mining.
The detailed rules proposed by the eight EEC members introduce the idea
of national area quotas absent from the U.S. and Group of 77 approaches.
There has been criticism that the U.S. and others' rules are too detailed,
and unnecessarily restrict the ability to adapt to new technological and
other conditions. The variations in proposed technical criteria in the
different sets of rules are cited as evidence of the need to avoid such
detail in the treaty itself.
In the closing days of the session, after earlier resistance to detailed
discussion of the content of general conditions of exploitation, Committee
I established a negotiating group with the mandate to consider Articles
1-21,21 placing special emphasis in its work on both Article 9 and con-
ditions of exploitation. The negotiating group met several times and en-
gaged in very constructive discussions on the Group of 77 text for Article
9. There emerged in these exploratory talks a definite willingness on the
part of a number of delegations supporting that text to explore changes
in the text without commitment.
Committee I devoted several days of direct on the record debate to the
issue of economic implications. Land-based producers of the metals con-
tained in manganese nodules had in previous sessions of the Seabed Com-
mittee succeeded in winning substantial support for price and production
controls.
The Caracas session resulted in two new developments on this issue.
First, detailed presentations and question-and-answer periods with repre-
sentatives of UNCTAD and the Secretary-General of the United Nations
served to highlight the great uncertainty regarding any threat that the
ocean mining industry may pose for the economies of developing country
producers of the metals contained in nodules. Second, several developing
country representatives made public statements on the need to protect
consumers from artificially high prices. This had never occurred in the
Seabed Committee.
The U.S. delegation submitted a working paper 22 and made statements
that pointed out the interests of all consumers in encouraging seabed out-
put, the unlikelihood that the income of existing producers would decrease,
even with seabed production, and the inherent difficulties and adverse
effects of schemes to protect land-based producers. Several developing
countries expressed a willingness not to require protective measures in the
Convention itself, and an insistence that a balance between consumer and
producer interests be structured into whatever machinery was created for
dealing with the potential problem.
19 A/CONF.62/C.1/L.9. 2oA/CONF.62/C1/L..8
21 Note 13, supra. 22 A/CONF.62/C.1/L.5.
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Committee I did not review the draft articles on the structure, powers,
and functions of the Seabed Authority, although the question of discretion
underlying the debate on Article 9 and conditions of exploitation is clearly
linked to this issue. Several implicit understandings seem to be involved
in this decision. The general outlines of the structure of the Authority are
essentially agreed. There would be an Assembly of all parties, a Council
of limited size, and necessary subsidiary organs. A trend is emerging in
favor of a special dispute settlement organ for deep seabed problems in
the Authority that embraces functions analogous to those of the French
Conseil d'Etat. A discussion of conditions of exploitation fixed in the treaty
is in fact a direct approach to the fundamental issue of defining the sub-
stantive scope of the Authority's decisionmaking powers with respect to
exploration and exploitation, since such decisions would have to be con-
sistent with the treaty. Thus, the basic issue put aside is that of the de-
cisionmaking process itself.
It is generally assumed that regulatory decisions would require approval
of a substantial majority of treaty parties, probably two-thirds. There is
considerable support for the view that a body of experts should initially
draft regulations and submit them first to the Council, which would also
have executive functions. The precise question therefore is the compo-
sition and voting procedures of the Council. The issue is simple: Are
states going to agree to be bound by decisions with which they may dis-
agree? Theorizing about sovereign equality with respect to voting leads
one nowhere; while some argue that sovereign equality requires decisions
on a "one state one-vote" basis, sovereign equality can just as easily mean
the right of each state to veto a decision, or the right of each state to de-
clare that it is not bound by the decisions of other states. All of these
options could seriously impair the system. The best alternative is to agree
on a Council that, in composition and voting structure, sufficiently balances
the substantive interests involved to inspire confidence when coupled with
precise and enforceable treaty limitations on the substantive scope of
decisions. Confidence will be further enhanced if there is provision for
member states to give their tacit approval to any rules approved by the
Council--4.e. not more than a stipulated number object within a specified
time period.
In sum, there was a new, more serious mood in the Committee that indi-
cated an understanding that genuine negotiation is needed if an agreement
is to be concluded.
Most delegations wanted to get to work immediately, and opposed an
initial plan for two weeks of general debate. Attempts to prohibit refer-
ence to the conditions of exploitation in the debate on Article 9, to ob-
struct progress in the negotiating group, to prevent informal economic
seminars on economic implications, and to rally support for a vote on
Article 9 did not succeed. In various general statements and in all drafts
of the basic conditions, the need to ensure an attractive and secure invest-
ment climate for deep seabed exploiters was acknowledged.
The differences of view cannot be disregarded. But there appears to be
19751
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a genuine desire to reconcile them, and to avoid as much as possible ob-
stacles to such a reconciliation.
THE SECOND COMMITTEE
Those who took a pessimistic view of the prospects for an early and
successful conclusion to the Law of the Sea Conference frequently noted
the fact that, in addition to the task of narrowing and resolving the basic
political differences, the necessary technical task of organizing in usable
form the large number of issues within the mandate of the Second Com-
mittee had not been performed by the Seabed Committee. Some also
added that even a first round of debate on these precise issues could take
years.
On August 28, the Chairman of Committee II of the Conference pre-
sented an extraordinary political and technical summary of its work. The
Committee decided to circulate that summary as an official Conference
document.2 Excerpts from that summary follow:
In 13 informal Working Papers the officers of the Committee sum-
marized the main trends with respect to the various subjects and
issues, as they had been manifested in proposals submitted to the
United Nations Seabed Committee or at the Conference itself ...
In view of the nature and purpose of those papers, each of them had
been submitted to the Committee in formal working meetings. Thus
all the members of the Committee have had the opportunity to make
observations on these papers in their original versions and in their
first revised versions. After considering those observations in detail,
the officers prepared a first and, in almost all cases, a second revision of
the papers which, by agreement of the Committee, is the final version.
Thus what we have is the collective work of the Committee which,
with the limitations and reservations to be indicated in the general
introduction, and, in some cases, in the explanatory notes accompany-
ing certain of the papers, is a faithful reflection of the main positions
on questions of substance that have taken the form of draft Articles
of a Convention.
Assembling these papers in a single text, with consecutive numbering
makes it possible to present in an orderly fashion the variants which
at this state of the work of the Conference are offered for considera-
tion by states with respect to the subjects and issues falling within
the Committee's competence.
This document, in my opinion, should serve not only as a reference
text relating to the most important work done by the Committee at this
session but also as a basis and point of departure for the future work
of this organ of the Conference. It would be senseless to begin all
over again the long and laborious process which has led us to the
point where we now stand.
No decision on substantive issues has been taken at this session, nor
has a single Article of the future Convention been adopted, but the
states present here know perfectly well which are at this time the
23 A/CONF.62/L.86.
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positions that enjoy support and which are the ones that have not
managed to make any headway.
The paper that sums up the main trends does not pronounce on the
degree of support which each of them had enlisted at the prepara-
tory meetings and the Conference itself, but it is now easy for anyone
who has followed our work closely to discern the outline of the future
Convention.
So far each state has put forward in general terms the positions which
would ideally satisfy its own range of interests in the seas and oceans.
Once these positions are established, we have before us the oppor-
tunity of negotiation based on an objective and realistic evaluation
of the relative strength of the different opinions.
It is not my intention in this statement to present a complete picture
of the situation as I see it personally, but I can offer some general
evaluations and comments.
The idea of a territorial sea of 12 miles and an exclusive economic
zone beyond the territorial sea up to a total maximum distance of 200
miles is, at least at this time, the keystone of the compromise solu-
tion favored by the majority of the states participating in the Con-
ference, as is apparent from the general debate in the Plenary meet-
ings, and the discussion held in our Committee.
Acceptance of this idea is, of course, dependent on the satisfactory
solution of other issues, especially the issue of passage through straits
used for international navigation, the outermost limit of the conti-
nental shelf and the actual retention of this concept and, last but not
least, the aspirations of the land-locked countries and of other coun-
tries, which, for one reason or another, consider themselves geographi-
cally disadvantaged.
There are, in addition, other problems to be studied and solved in
connection with this idea, for example, those relating to archipelagos
and the regime of islands in general.
It is also necessary to go further into the matter of the nature and char-
acteristics of the concept of the exclusive economic zone, a subject on
which important differences of opinion still persist.
On all these subjects substantial progress has been made which lays
the foundations for negotiation during the intersessional period and at
the next session of the Conference.
The thirteen informal working papers have been reorganized into a
single working paper containing 243 provisions divided into 13 parts that
correspond to the thirteen original papers.2 4 This paper is an appropriate
point of departure for discussing the work of the Second Committee.
Part I:
TEHMORLAL SEA
Agreement on a 12-mile territorial sea is so widespread that there were
virtually no references to any other limit in the public debate, although
24 Note 1, supra.
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other alternatives are presented in the working paper. Major conditions
for acceptance of 12 miles as a maximum limit were agreement on unim-
peded transit of straits and acceptance of a 200-mile exclusive economic
zone. A variety of articles have been introduced, and incorporated in the
working paper, on baselines for measuring the territorial sea and on the
innocent passage regime which, with some differences, parallel the pro-
visions of the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention.25  One interesting aspect
of the paper is the elaboration of the meaning of innocent passage and
the regulatory powers of the coastal state with respect to such passage
(Provisions XXVI to XXVIII), largely based on proposals initially pre-
sented by Fiji 20 and by the United Kingdom.27
Part I1:
CONTIGUOUS ZONE
The contiguous zone is an area where the coastal state may take mea-
sures to prevent and punish infringement of its customs, fiscal, immigra-
tion, and sanitary laws in its territory or territorial sea. Its maximum limit
is 12 miles under the 1958 Territorial Sea Convention. Some states seem
to feel that with the establishment of a 12-mile territorial sea, the contigu-
ous zone has become superfluous. Others would like it extended to an
area beyond 12 miles.
In examining this question, it might be considered whether the modem
radar facilities may be a cheaper and more effective deterrent than the
wide-ranging patrol craft needed to enforce the theoretical liability to
arrest-which the smuggler is prepared to risk as he approaches shore
anyway.
The question of contiguous zone jurisdiction extending beyond 12 miles
is important not only on its merits, but because agreement will become
more difficult as more types of jurisdiction are added to the economic zone.
Resolution of some issues, such as pollution and scientific research within
the economic zone, is already complicated by concerns about encouraging
a territorial attitude toward the economic zone which would ultimately
prejudice navigation.
Part III:
STRAITS USED FOR NAVIGATIONAL PURPOSES
The introduction of the U.K. articles 28 was the major event of the session
on the straits issue. The United Kingdom-as both a maritime power and
a state bordering the most heavily, used strait in the world-necessarily
sought an accommodation of the interests involved. These articles were
25 Conventionon the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. 15 UST 1606; TIAS
5639; 516 UNTS 205; 52 AJIL 851 (1958).
28 A/CONF.62/C.2/L.19. 27 A/CONF.62/C.2/L.3.
28Note 27, supra.
[VCol. 6
CONFERENCE ON THE LAW OF THE SEA
well received. The USSR 29 and Omanso introduced articles on straits
as well. In general, the trend was in the direction of unimpeded passage.
While there was little public movement toward conciliation on the part
of the straits states, debate was less heated.
The United States and others made statements reiterating the funda-
mental importance of unimpeded passage on, over, and under straits used
for international navigation and addressed means of accommodating the
concerns of straits states with respect to security, safety, and pollution. The
United States also made clear its view that distinctions regarding the right
of passage could not be made between commercial vessels and warships.
The "security" problem with submarine and military aircraft transit
of straits is in fact one of limiting the right to transit to its normal in-
cidents. It is a legitimate problem and the working paper contains numer-
ous texts designed to deal with it. But the problem cannot be resolved
until it is clearly recognized that sophisticated warships, submarines, and
high-speed aircraft need not, and would in fact not be foolish enough to,
enter narrow straits passages if their intent were hostile. Many of the
great naval defeats of history occurred when warships exposed themselves
to attack in confined areas. It should also be recognized that the legitimate
interest of a straits state in avoiding involvement in differences among
others is prejudiced, not enhanced, if that state requires or receives notice
of, or grants authorization for, transit.
By identifying the precise issues involved, including relevant definitions
of straits, proposed "exceptions" for straits where a new regime of unim-
peded passage might not be necessary, and elaboration of the protections
for straits states, the working paper may make a significant contribution
to a narrowing and successful resolution of the issues. However, the un-
derlying political issue remains vital to the success of the Conference:
whether essential lines of communication through straits should be sub-
ject to discretionary interference by the riparian states. There is simply
no possibility of a widely accepted treaty that does not answer this ques-
tion in the negative.
Part IV:
CONTINENTAL SHEMY
Part V:
EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE BEYOND THE TERRITORIAL SEA
Part VI:
COASTAL STATE PPREFEENTAL IGHTS OR OTHER NONEXCLUSIVE
JURISDICTION OVER RESOURCES BEYOND TER TEMUTORIL SEA
These three parts of the paper basically address the same issue: the
nature and extent of coastal state jurisdiction over resources beyond the
1975]
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territorial sea. Part IV deals primarily with nonliving resources, while
Part VI deals primarily with living resources; Part V deals with both.
Although this division creates certain methodological problems, it reflects
strongly held substantive views. Some believe the doctrine of the conti-
nental shelf should be wholly or partially subsumed within the economic
zone, while others disagree. Some would give a strong role to interna-
tional organizations in management of coastal fisheries coupled with coastal
state preferential rights, while others would place management respon-
sibility in the coastal state in a 200-mile zone. The nature and content of
the economic zone are in fact the central issue.
Over 100 countries spoke in support of an economic zone extending to
a limit of 200 nautical miles as part of an overall treaty settlement. With
respect to the content of the zone, there is widespread support for the
following:
(a) Coastal state sovereign or exclusive rights for the purpose of ex-
ploration and exploitation of living and nonliving resources;
(b) Exclusive coastal state rights over artificial islands and most in-
stallations;
(c) Exclusive coastal state rights over drilling for all purposes;
(d) Coastal state rights and duties with respect to pollution and scien-
tific research to be specified, presumably in the Chapters of the Conven-
tion being prepared in Committee III.
There is general agreement that there would be freedom of navigation
and overflight in the economic zone, as well as rights to lay and maintain
submarine cables and pipelines. Provisions for the accommodation of uses
in the zone would be included. The question of "residual rights" not
specifically granted to the coastal states or all states remains to be resolved,
and is discussed below.
With a few exceptions, economic zone proposals have now been prof-
fered by all conference groups, including the United States."' It is
widely recognized that the precise issues presented by a variety of detailed
provisions in these proposals will determine whether this overall frame-
work can be translated into a generally acceptable treaty. Virtually all
these details, in alternative form, are now present in the working paper,
thus laying a clear foundation for negotiation and decision of these issues.
The major problems encountered in the economic zone negotiation cen-
ter on the following points:
(1) Do the rights of coastal states over the resources of the seabed and
subsoil of the continental shelf extend beyond 200 miles where the con-
tinental margin extends beyond that limit? While a trend toward agree-
ment on such jurisdiction is discernible, with some states declaring that
such jurisdiction is a condition of agreement for them, landlocked and
geographically disadvantaged states, and some African coastal states, favor
limiting coastal state jurisdiction to a 200-mile zone. The U.S. proposal
of an accommodation that includes coastal state jurisdiction over the mar-
31A/CONF.62/C.2/L.47.
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gin coupled with revenue-sharing as a solution to the problem is picking
up additional support, but is still strongly opposed by some coastal states
with large margins. The idea proposed by some landlocked states that
they have rights of access to mineral resources under the jurisdiction of
adjacent coastal states has met strong and widespread opposition.
(2) What are the duties of the coastal states with respect to conserva-
tion and full utilization of fish stocks? What are the rights of access of
landlocked states to fisheries? What is the role of regional and interna-
tional organizations in fisheries management? What special provisions
should be included for highly migratory species and for anadromous
species?
Three main approaches seem to have emerged with respect to fisheries
in the economic zone. One is complete exclusivity with no coastal state
duties. Another is the U.S. type approach, which couples exclusive coastal
state regulation with conservation and full utilization duties, and special
treatment for anadromous species and highly migratory species. A third,
exemplified by the articles presented by eight EEC states,12 emphasizes
the role of regional organizations. While advocates of the first approach
dwelt largely on conceptual arguments in the public meetings, private dis-
cussions tended to reveal more flexibility.
The provisions in the U.S. articles 23 on highly migratory species such as
tuna represent a new attempt to find a reasonable accommodation. They
provide for coastal state regulation in the economic zone in accordance
with international and regional conservation and allocation regulations, and
include fees, special allocations, enforcement rights, and other protections
for the coastal state. A number of developing country delegates have com-
mented favorably on the U.S. move.
In response to conceptual problems with jurisdiction following anadro-
mous species such as salmon beyond the economic zone, the United States
has now proposed a ban on fishing for such species beyond the territorial
sea, except as authorized by the state of origin, for purposes of ensuring
full utilization.
(4) What principles apply to the delimitation of the economic zone or
continental shelf between adjacent and opposite states? Any precise for-
mula will tend to divide the Conference, since for each coastal state that
supports a particular rule-e.g., equidistance-another naturally reacts in
fear that it will lose some area. This problem has in turn given rise to
arguments over the weight to be given to islands in such delimitation and,
even further, to arguments that small or uninhabited islands are not en-
titled to an economic zone at all. The general question of islands is dealt
with in Part XIII of the working paper. The realization is growing that
the Conference could become hopelessly bogged down if it tries to deal
definitely with essentially bilateral delimitation problems.
(5) What is the legal status of the economic zone? It is clear that the
economic zone is not a territorial sea. However, some classic high seas
32 A/CONF.62/C.2/L.40.
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freedoms will be eliminated (e.g., fishing) or modified. Subject to the
provisions of the Convention (for example, provisions on pollution), other
freedoms will be retained (e.g., navigation and overflight). It appears
that the provisions of the Convention regarding coastal states' rights will
need finther elaboration before some states are prepared to grapple with
the issue of the legal status of the economic zone in precise terms.
In an effort to mollify such concerns, and taking into account the need
to avoid confusion with respect to the application of a variety of different
treaties and principles of international and domestic law, the United
States, after consultation with a number of coastally-oriented states, intro-
duced the following text: 31
The regime of the high seas, as codified in the 1958 United Nations
Convention on the High Seas, shall apply as modified by the pro-
visions of this Chapter [High Seas] and the other provisions of this
Convention, including, inter alia, those with respect to the economic
zone, the continental shelf, the protection of the marine environment,
scientific research and the international sea-bed area.
(7) Dispute Settlement. Since the heart of the economic zone negotia-
tion turns on a balance of rights and duties, the question of dispute settle-
ment is a critical, substantive element. On the one hand, guarantees are
sought against unreasonable interpretations, particularly as they affect
navigation and overflight. On the other hand, a measure of discretion
for coastal state resource management is clearly inherent in the exercise
of resource jurisdiction.
There appears to be a genuine desire to negotiate on these questions
and they are likely to dominate regional and international consultations
before the next session.
Part VII:
HIGH SEAS AND TRANSMISSION FROM THE HIGH SEAS
The provisions in this part of the working paper are largely derived from
the Convention on the High Seas."" The most difficult problem concerns
the legal status of the waters of the economic zone, as already noted.
Certain new proposals were made regarding suppression of drug traffic, 8
transmission from the high seas,3 ' hot pursuit,38 and flag state duties,89 as
well as conservation of living resources beyond the economic zone.'0
Proposals for a different concept of "international seas" are also included.
One important characteristic of these proposals is a purported exhaustive
enumeration of freedoms, rather than the partial enumeration coupled with
31 A/CONF.62/C.2/L.79.
35 Convention on the High Seas. 13 UST 2312; TIAS 5200; 450 UNTS 82; 52
AJIL 842 (1958).
36 Main Trends paper, note 1 supra, provision 174.
sT Id., provision 177. 38 Id., provisions 175-76.
39 Id., provision 142. 40 Id., provisions 155-63.
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reference to freedoms 'recognized by the general principles of international
law" contained in the High Seas Convention.
The high seas comprise all parts of the sea not included in the internal
waters or territorial sea of a state.41 Indeed, this is the major significance
of the territorial sea limit. The underlying assumption of many states in
the negotiation has long been that aside from resource issues, and subject
to a reasonable accommodation on scientific research and pollution, free-
dom of the high seas beyond the territorial sea would be preserved, per-
haps with some modifications or clarifications (e.g., coastal state exclusive
jurisdiction with respect to artificial islands in the economic zone). The
serious implications for reaching agreement of a fundamental change in
the negotiating assumptions regarding a matter as complex and funda-
mental as this should be clear to all.
Part VIII:
LANDLOCKED COUNTMES
Most of this part of the paper deals with the problem of access to the
sea for landlocked countries. Happily, the question does not appear to be
one of principle. Most coastal states readily acknowledge the need to deal
with the problem in a positive way. The difficulty is one of emphasis,
detail, and implementation, matters which many landlocked countries are
reluctant to leave entirely to subsequent bilateral arrangements. Two
alternative texts in the paper serve to illustrate some of the areas of agree-
ment and difficulty.
Provision 181
Formula A
The right of landlocked States to free access to and from the sea is
one of the basic principles of the law of the sea and forms an integral
part of the principles of international law.
In order to enjoy the freedom of the seas and to participate in the
exploration and exploitation of the seabed and its resources on equal
terms with coastal States, landlocked States, irrespective of the origin
and characteristics of their landlocked conditions, shall have the right
of free access to and from the sea in accordance with the provisions of
this Convention.
The right of free access to and from the sea of landlocked States
shall be the concern of the international community as a whole and the
exercise of such right shall not depend exclusively on the transit States.
Since free transit of landlocked States forms part of their right of
free access to and from the sea which belongs to them in view of their
special geographical position, reciprocity shall not be a condition of
free transit of landlocked States required by transit States but may
be agreed between the parties concerned.
,1 Hligh Seas Convention, note 35 supra, Art. 1.
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Formula B
Each landlocked State shall enjoy free access to and from the sea.
Neighboring transit States shall accord, on a basis of reciprocity,
free transit through their territories of persons and goods of landlocked
States by all possible means of transportation and communication.
The modalities of the exercise of free transit shall be settled between
the landlocked States and the neighboring transit States by means of
bilateral or regional agreements.
Landlocked States shall have the freedom to use one or more of the
alternative routes or means of transport, as agreed with the transit
States concerned, for purposes of access to and from the sea.
The remainder of this part of the working paper deals with participation
of landlocked countries in the international regime and machinery for the
deep seabeds and in the exploitation of the living resources of the eco-
nomic zones of neighboring coastal states. With respect to the latter
question, one issue is whether nationals of landlocked states would enjoy
equal treatment with coastal state nationals in all or part of the economic
zone of an adjacent coastal state, or whether they would enjoy preference
over the treatment given nationals of any third states. The U.S. economic
zone proposal takes the former approach. Another issue relates to balanc-
ing the desire of coastal states to prevent any transfer of landlocked state
rights to third parties with the desire of landlocked states to be able to
obtain technical and financial assistance for the purpose of developing their
fishing industries.
Part IX:
RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF SHELF-LOCKED STATES AND STATES WITH
NARROW SHELVES OR SHORT COASTLINES
The substance of this paper addresses the right of "geographically dis-
advantaged States" to access to living resources in the economic zone of
neighboring coastal states. The substantive issues presented regarding
access to living resources are essentially the same as in the case of land-
locked states. However, some states are not as prepared to agree to
special rights in this case as they are in the case of neighboring landlocked
states.
A further question relates to the definition of "geographically disad-
vantaged States," in essence the substantive criteria justifying a special
right of access. Although several criteria for defining "geographically
disadvantaged states" are proposed, the heart of the matter relates to a
coastal state which cannot derive substantial economic advantage from the
establishment of an economic zone off its own coast and suffers actual or
potential disadvantage from the establishment of a zone by others. A
frequent example is a state with a small coastline facing the coasts of
others. Were the regime of freedom of fishing to continue beyond 12
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miles, such a state would presumably continue, or have the opportunity
to commence, fishing in such areas.
The U.S. proposal' 2 attempts to find a middle ground on the fishing
issue by making it clear that the coastal state has priority in its economic
zone to the extent of its fishing capacity and the right, but not the obliga-
tion, to treat nationals of economically dependent neighbors as its nationals
in determining its capacity and their rights of access.
Of course, some international revenue-sharing from the hydrocarbon re-
sources of the economic zone and continental margin beyond the 200-meter
isobath as proposed by the United States would introduce a major element
of accommodation with respect to the underlying problem of the unequal
geographic situation of states.
Part X:
ARCHIPELAGOS
The proposals for a special regime for archipelagos generally relate to
"a group of islands, including parts of islands, interconnecting waters, and
other natural features which are so closely interrelated that such islands,
waters, and other natural features form an intrinsic geographical, eco-
nomic, and political entity, or which historically have been regarded as
such." Under all variants proposed, the coastal state would exercise sov-
ereignty over marine areas within the archipelago, subject to passage
rights, and would measure its maritime jurisdiction from straight lines
enclosing the archipelago connecting the outermost islands. While anal-
ogies are drawn by proponents of the archipelago concept to the system of
straight baselines approved in the Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries case ', and
Article 4 of the Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous
Zone," the situations are different.
In practical terms, the major island nations advocating the archipelago
theory lay astride some of the most important communications routes in
the world and seek to enclose very substantial marine areas. The issue
has been complicated by the addition of arguments for archipelagic treat-
ment of island groups belonging to continental states, with substantial dif-
ferences of view indicated in Conference statements on this issue. Since
virtually all archipelago areas being discussed would be embraced by a
200-mile economic zone, it is doubtful whether the underlying rationale
proffered by island nations for the archipelago concept, particularly that
of political unity, is applicable to states that are not island nations and
whether the practical effects of extending the concept are justifiable.
Two key issues require resolution for a satisfactory accommodation on
the issue whether a regime of archipelagic waters should be included in
the treaty.
42 Note 31, supra.
"Note 25, suMra.
43 [1951] ICJ REp. 116.
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The first is a precise definition and limitation of the areas that may be
enclosed, in order to permit states to understand the precise consequences
of what they are accepting, and to prevent attempts to apply the concept
to enclose far-flung small islands and other situations where its application
would be unreasonable. Among the criteria proposed are land-to-water
ratios and precise maximum lengths for archipelagic lines. A reasonable
combination of the two would ensure compactness and the type of rela-
tionship between islands and water that constitutes the underlying reason
for the proposals.
The second issue is that of rights of navigation and overflight. In ap-
proaching this issue, it must be recognized that substantial areas that would
otherwise be high seas would become archipelagic waters. Traditional
doctrines such as innocent passage are objectionable for many of the same
reasons as exist in connection with straits. On the other hand, it is com-
plete freedom of navigation and overflight, rather than unimpeded transit,
that is the source of the concerns that some island nations have expressed.
Some see a solution to this critical issue in the establishment of an unam-
biguous right of transit through the archipelago for all vessels and aircraft
coupled with the designation of adequate lanes for the exercise of the
right. It remains to be seen whether such an accommodation can be found.
It would of course be related to an overall satisfactory settlement of navi-
gation issues, including those regarding straits.
Part XI:
ENCLOSED AND SEMI-ENCLOSED SEAS
In a sense, this paper is a microcosm of the overall negotiation. It
touches on virtually all the problems regarding the nature, extent, and
delimitation of coastal state jurisdiction, and international and regional
cooperation in the exercise of that jurisdiction.
Some of the world's most important high seas areas can be regarded as
enclosed or semi-enclosed seas. Much of the world's trade passes through
these areas. The strategic importance of some is obvious. It would there-
fore appear that, insofar as the navigation and other rights of the inter-
national community as a whole and the rights of coastal states vis-&-vis
the community are concerned, it is necessary to treat such areas in terms of
the universally applicable provisions of the treaty.
Some of the provisions in this part of the worldng paper provide for
special cooperation among the riparian states within the general framework
of the treaty. On its face, this would appear to be desirable. However,
to the extent that questions regarding access to resources, transit rights,
and delimitation between neighboring states are involved, these are lifkely
to be the same as the questions arising in the context of the universally
applicable provisions of the treaty.
In brief, given the importance of the areas in question, this agenda item
contains the inherent risk of requiring many of the same issues to be
negotiated twice. Hopefully, this can be avoided.
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Part XII:
AIrIFICIAL ISLANDS AND INSTALLATIONS
This part of the working paper concentrates on the important issue of
accommodation of uses. By their very nature, artificial islands and large
installations preclude alternative use of the areas they occupy. Moreover,
safety zones may be necessary to protect the installations and navigation.
The Convention on the Continental Shelf addresses these issues, but only
in terms of resource exploration and exploitation equipment.'5 This part
of the working paper deals with the issue in principle, and thereby also
covers a host of new uses: deepwater ports, offshore airports, power plants,
etc.
The paper reflects the general view that artificial islands, deepwater
ports, airports, power plants, and similar new fixed economic uses of the
economic zone should be subject to coastal state authorization and regu-
lation. This view no doubt emanates in some measure from the fact that
any such uses would probably entail substantial potential permanent inter-
ference with the exercise of the resource jurisdiction of the coastal state
in the area. The paper also reflects the general view that the coastal state
would be under a duty to prevent such artificial islands and installations
from unjustiflably interfering with navigation and other uses of the sea.
While reasonable safety zones could be established around them where
necessary, territorial seas and economic zones would not be measured from
artificial islands and installations, except perhaps as currently specified in
the distinguishable technical provisions of the Territorial Sea Convention
dealing with lighthouses on low-tide elevations and with roadsteads."6
The High Seas Convention, of course, provides that the laying and
maintenance of submarine cables and pipelines is a freedom enjoyed by all
states.4r The Continental Shelf Convention contains provisions regarding
accommodation of this right with the resource interests of the coastal
state.48 These texts have been reintroduced, and it would appear that this
general approach, perhaps with some clarifications, will continue.
The working paper also contains proposed provisions on military in-
stallations and devices on the continental shelf. During the discussion,
other states noted that arms control questions were more properly ad-
dressed in other forums and could complicate the negotiations. They
pointed out that the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons
of mass destruction on the seabed was already prohibited beyond twelve
miles from the coast by the Seabed Arms Control Treaty, 9 and that this
45 Convention on the Continental Shelf. 15 UST 471; TIAS 5578; 499 UNTS 311;
52 AJIL 858 (1958). Art. 5.
46 Note 25, supra. Arts. 4 and 9.
47 Note 35, supra. Art. 21.
48 Note 45, supra. Art. 4.
49Treaty on the Prohibition of the Emplacement of Nuclear Weapons and Other
Weapons of Mass Destruction on the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and in the Subsoil
Thereof. 23 UST 701; TIAS 7337. Art. 1.
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treaty would by its terms be subject to review within a short time after a
Law of the Sea treaty could be expected to enter into force.
Part XII:
E.EGIVE OF ISLANDS
Should a coastal state be entitled to exercise the same jurisdiction in the
marine area adjacent to an island as it would if the area were adjacent to
a continent?
The Territorial Sea Convention and the Continental Shelf Convention
make no distinction. Indeed, the former treats island fringes along the
coast in the same way as deeply indented coastlines for purposes of es-
tablishing a system of straight baselines," and the latter expressly provides
that an island has, in juridical terms, a "continental" shelf.51 A distinction
is only made between islands and low-tide elevations; the latter, with some
precise technical exceptions, do not provide a basis for exercising maritime
jurisdiction.52
Some argue that a distinction is implied by the reference to "special
circumstances" in the articles on delimitation of area of jurisdiction be-
tween neighboring coastal states,58 and by the references to relative length
of coastline in the North Sea Continental Shelf " cases on delimitation. It
should be noted, however, that this concerns the issue of delimitation, not
entitlement to jurisdiction in principle.
Proponents of maintaining the existing approach and according the same
rights to islands in principle argue that they have vested rights under in-
ternational law of which they cannot be deprived. Some point out that
the inhabitants of small islands may be more dependent on marine re-
sources than the inhabitants of large continents.
A number of newly independent developing nations are composed of
small islands. The proponents of limitations on the jurisdiction that can
be exercised by virtue of sovereignty over small islands tend to emphasize
several different considerations. The debate between Greek and Turkish
representatives on the issue derives from a situation in which the exten-
sion of the territorial sea to 12 miles around Aegean islands would elimi-
nate most of the high seas in the area and the direct access to the high
seas from significant parts of the Turkish coast, as well as affect the
lateral delimitation situation. A number of states emphasize equitable
considerations with respect to delimitation of areas of jurisdiction betveen
small islands and large continental coasts. Thus, some proposals dis-
tinguish between "adjacent" and "non-adjacent" islands. Some are con-
cerned about reduction in the size of the international seabed area.
50 Note 25, supra. Art. 4. 51 Note 45, supra. Art. 1.
2 Territorial Sea Convention, note 25, supra. Arts. 10 and 11.
53 Id., Art. 12; Continental Shelf Convention, note 45, supra. Art. 6.
64 [19691 ICJ REP. 3.
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In an unfortunate move that clearly injects political issues, some have
sought to make a distinction for "islands under foreign domination and
control." The very legal formula, of course, begs the question and in-
vites dispute: it is questionable whether a state will regard itself as foreign
to an area over which it claims sovereignty. There are many states that
have islands, and there are many states with islands that do not form part
of an historical cultural unit with the mainland or may not be regarded
as such by another state with an incentive for taking such a position.
Some states would make distinctions between islands, islets, and rocks.
Some distinguish islands on the continental shelf of another state, although
juridically this, of course, begs the question. Some consider population
a relevant factor.
From a political perspective, it might be noted that sovereignty over
many islands is in doubt or in dispute. Moreover, no geographer is likely
to assert that all high-tide elevations have made their appearance. The
promise of jurisdiction over seabed minerals or fisheries could well serve
to stimulate or exacerbate disputes over islands. Indeed, it is arguable
that this has already begun to happen.
The development of seabed mining and fixed installations creates a new
need for precise and permanent jurisdictional boundaries. An important
aspect of the issue is the "boundary" between resources under coastal state
jurisdiction and resources of the international seabed area. Provision for
coastal state submission within a reasonable time of a precise and perma-
nent delineation of the seaward limit of its seabed jurisdiction (the "bound-
ary" with the international area), subject to impartial international review,
might not only allay concerns regarding the location of the precise limit
of the continental margin, but also in effect freeze the island situation and
avoid the difficulties that might otherwise be attendant upon the discovery
or formation of a new high-tide elevation at sea.
This part of the working paper in essence tries to come to grips with a
fundamental problem in all of the law of the sea, exacerbated by the ex-
tension of the breadth of jurisdictional zones: the length of a coastline
and its exposure to the open sea bear no necessary relationship to ab-
stract equitable criteria for apportioning ocean areas and resources. To
this one might add that two areas identical in size may differ vastly in
their importance to navigation or resource content. Seen in this light, the
solution to many aspects of the islands problem is part of the solution to
the broader problems of navigation and straits, limitations on coastal state
jurisdiction in the economic zone, and delimitation among neighboring
states.
THE THIRD COMMITTEE
Most of the work of the Third Committee was done in informal sessions
of the Committee which were the equivalent of working groups. Partial
consolidated texts were forwarded on preservation of the marine environ-
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ment 5 and on marine scientific research and development and transfer
of technology.58 Those to which no reservations are noted, and which do
not appear in alternative form, can be regarded as approved at the level
of the informal sessions.
MABINE POLLUTION
Committee III met 22 times in informal session as a small negotiating
group to deal with marine pollution issues. Draft articles were completed
on general obligations to prevent pollution, particular obligations, global
and regional cooperation, technical assistance, rights of states to exploit
their resources, and the relevance of economic factors to the obligations of
developing countries. These texts were not fully agreed and the United
States, among others, opposed the last two in their entirety. Discussion
continued, particularly on an informal basis, on the right to set standards
and to enforce them and on monitoring. The Committee did not begin
consideration of state responsibility and liability, sovereign immunity, or
settlement of disputes.
A basic difficulty faced in the discussions related to the problem of
qualifying the treaty obligation of states "to protect and preserve the
marine environment," to "take all necessary measures to prevent, reduce
and control pollution of the marine environment from any source using
for this purpose the best practical means at their disposal and in accord-
ance with their capabilities, individually or jointly, as appropriate," and
to "take all necessary measures" to ensure that activities under their juris-
diction and control "do not cause damage to areas beyond their national
jurisdiction including damage to other States and their environment by
pollution of the marine environment."
Three types of qualifications are present in the consolidated texts, alone
or in combination. One, in essence, is introduced by the language "pur-
suant to its environmental policies" qualifying a state's legal obligation.
While this text is probably designed to introduce a measure of flexibility
as to the type of environmental programs used, the context of its intro-
duction is related to the remaining qualifications.
A second qualification preserves "the sovereign right of a state to ex-
ploit its own natural resources pursuant to its environmental policies and
programmes for economic development and in accordance with its duty
to protect and preserve the marine environment." The text is amenable
to extreme interpretations that would render it either meaningless or totally
contradictory to other articles. The intent would appear to be to pre-
serve the right to develop resources and resource management flexibility
subject to respect for environmental duties, and this interpretation would
of course be compatible with the other articles. Needless to say, this
text is an attempt to express in legal terms the underlying need to har-
monize economic and environmental interests.
The third qualification would make the legal obligation to prevent and
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control pollution dependent on the ability to discharge that obligation and
the stage of economic development of a state. It, of course, entails the
obvious risk of rendering the obligation essentially hypothetical for most,
if not all, states. One alternative text would qualify all environmental
obligations in this way, while another would limit the qualification to
land-based sources of marine pollution.
Needless to say, there is opposition to all the qualifications on environ-
mental grounds. In addition to environmental problems, the third quali-
fication-which is, of course, not a matter of economic or technical assis-
tance-raises the difcult problem of imposing different legal obligations
on developed and developing countries. Strong resistance on these grounds
can be expected and it poses a more general problem in international law
as well. One of the most curious effects would be that developing coun-
tries would not enjoy many of the benefits of the treaty obligations, since
all have mostly developing country neighbors.
At the next session, the Committee will begin with the article on moni-
toring and then take up standard setting and enforcement rights. The
basic problem of vessel-source pollution remains to be addressed, although
a trend against coastal state standard setting is already evident, particu-
larly with respect to construction and design standards.
Negotiations have moved to the point of beginning on the major contro-
versial issues of standards and enforcement, particularly regarding vessel-
source pollution. Private negotiations and consultations indicated con-
siderable detailed consideration of specific problems and a willingness to
discuss realistic solutions.
MANE SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT AND TBANSFER
OF TECHNOLOGY
The Informal Working Group on Marine Scientific Research and De-
velopment and Transfer of Technology held 21 meetings, either in informal
session or as a negotiating group.
Initially, there was an attempt to elaborate a definition of scientific re-
search drawing from the definition elaborated by the Seabed Committee
which excluded industrial exploration and specified that such research
should be conducted for peaceful purposes. Several proposals were made
by developing countries to delete these two qualifications. After incon-
clusive discussion, the informal committee decided to put the definitional
question aside.
Agreement, however, was reached on general principles for the con-
duct of research as well as obligations for international and regional co-
operation. The general principles include a requirement that scientific
research be conducted exclusively for peaceful purposes; a clause dealing
with noninterference with other uses; a requirement that research comply
with applicable environmental regulations; and agreement that research
activities shall not form the legal basis for any claim to any part of the
marine environment or its resources.
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The most important issues, and those on which there was the greatest
divergence of views, centered upon research in the economic zone. As
deliberations neared conclusion four major trends emerged. Those trends
were set forth in the Report of the Working Group which is expected to
form the basis for negotiations at the next session.
One of those trends was tabled by Colombia and is stated to represent
"The consensus of the Group of 77 of the Third Committee, without com-
mitting the final position of the members of the Group." 57 This proposal
provides that all research in the economic zone-including that conducted
by satellites-requires the explicit consent of the coastal state. Publica-
tion of results also requires coastal state consent. Research in the inter-
national area would be conducted directly by the International Authority
or under its regulation or control. The introduction of the satellites issue,
of course, iaises questions of outer space law beyond the purview of the
law of the sea as such, dealt with in the Outer Space Treaty and under
consideration in the Outer Space Committee of the UN General Assembly.
The second trend, although not based on a formal proposal, follows the
language of the Continental Shelf Convention and provides that, while
consent is required to conduct research in the economic zone, this con-
sent shall not normally be withheld when certain conditions are met. It
contains no reference to research in the international area.
The third trend provides for an agreed set of international requirements
for the conduct of research in the economic zone in lieu of a requirement
to obtain coastal state consent. The proposal also contains provisions re-
garding notice, participation, interpretation, and assistance for landlocked
and geographically disadvantaged states in the region as well. Research
in the international area may be carried out by all states. This trend is
based on a proposal introduced by 17 states, a majority of which are de-
veloping countries.58
In general, the precise requirements for scientific research in the latter
two trends are designed to insure respect for coastal state interests in the
area of resource jurisdiction and reflect similar points: notice, participa-
tion, sharing and assistance in interpreting data, samples, and results, and
respect for applicable environmental regulations.
The fourth and final trend provides for total freedom to carry out re-
search in the economic zone "except that marine scientific research aimed
directly at the exploration or exploitation of the living and non-living re-
sources shall be subject to the consent of the coastal state. In the inter-
national area, all states have the freedom to carry out marine scientific
research related to the seabed, subsoil and superjacent waters."
In addition to the above, proposals were made with respect to the legal
status of marine research installations and the responsibility and liability
of those conducting research. These proposals, however, were not for-
mally discussed at this session.
57 A/CONF.62/C.3/L.13.
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With respect to research installations and equipment other than vessels,
three of the issues raised are: whether the consent of the coastal state is
necessary in the economic zone in all cases or only insofar as it would be
necessary in other cases; irrespective of the consent issue, whether the
installation or equipment is subject to coastal state or flag state jurisdic-
tion, or both; and whether, with respect to both of the issues posed above,
a distinction should be made between "fixed" (presumably stationary) and
"floating" (presumably free floating) equipment.
Nigeria and Sri Lanka introduced separate formal proposals on tech-
nology transfer. Sri Lanka formally withdrew its proposal and joined
with Nigeria and about 20 others in cosponsoring a subsequent proposal
on technology transfer.5 9 This proposal calls for transfer of technology,
including the facilitation of transferring patented and nonpatented tech-
nology through agreements under equitable and reasonable conditions. It
requires, inter alia, that the Authority ensure that legal arrangements with
respect to seabed activities provide for the training of developing state
nationals, and that all patents on machinery and processes for exploiting
the international area be made available to developing states upon request.
DISPUTE SETTLEMENT
Aside from Committee I, there has not been much public debate in the
Conference on dispute settlement, although there are many states that
regard it as a critical aspect of the negotiations. In the latter part of the
session about 30 states from all regions interested in dispute settlement
met informally on a regular basis to discuss ideas and provisions for the
dispute settlement chapter of the Convention. The Group was chaired
by Ambassadors Galindo Pohl of El Salvador and Harry of Australia.
Professor Louis Sohn of Harvard Law School served as rapporteur. The
result is a working paper containing alternative texts on basic provisions
introduced during the last week of the Conference by Australia, Belgium,
Bolivia, Colombia, El Salvador, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Singapore, and
the United States 11 and viewed with favor by most members of the Group.
The new paper is likely to stimulate further study and discussion during
the period before the next session of the Conference.
The paper resulted from some of the most serious and constructive meet-
ings of the entire session. It contains draft alternative texts, and notes in-
dicating relevant precedents, on the following eleven points:
(1) Obligation to settle disputes under the Convention by peaceful
means.
(2) Settlement of disputes by means chosen by the parties.
(3) Clause relating to other obligations. The issue dealt with is whether,
in the absence of express agreement to the contrary, precedence is given to
the procedures in the Convention or other procedures accepted by the
parties entailing a binding decision.
59 A/CONF.62/C.3/L.12.
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(4) Clause relating to settlement procedures not entailing a binding de-
cision. In a situation in which a dispute is referred to nonbinding pro-
cedures, these articles deal with the question of when a party is entitled
to invoke applicable binding procedures under the Convention.
(5) Obligation to resort to a means of settlement resulting in a binding
decision. Three alternative forums are described in connection with the
obligation: arbitration, a special Law of the Sea Tribunal, and the Inter-
national Court of Justice.
(6) The relationship between general and functional approaches. Dur-
ing the discussion, there was considerable support for special functional
forums in connection with some issues. The most widely discussed was
a special Dispute Settlement Forum within the Seabed Authority. The
issue addressed here is whether, and to what extent, there is recourse from
a special functional forum to the general procedures established by the
Convention.
(7) Parties to a dispute. These texts establish that the dispute settle-
ment machinery would be open to state parties to the Convention, and then
addresses the issue of whether, and the extent to which, international or-
ganizations and natural juridical persons could be involved.
(8) Local remedies. The texts deal with the question of exhaustion of
local remedies.
(9) Advisory jurisdiction. The question addressed is whether a national
court, duly authorized by domestic law, may request an advisory opinion
from the Law of the Sea Tribunal on a question relating to the interpreta-
tion or application of the Convention.
(10) Law applicable. The question addressed is whether and under
what circumstances rules, in addition to the Law of the Sea Convention,
may apply, including bilateral agreements, regulations of international or-
ganizations pursuant to the Convention, and the right of parties to agree
to seek a settlement ex aequo et bono.
(11) Exceptions and reservations to the dispute settlement provisions.
The issue addressed is whether, and with respect to what issues, there
would be exceptions to the dispute settlement obligations of the Convention.
CONCLUSION
There can be a widely acceptable Law of the Sea Treaty in 1975. Most
states desire this. In almost all important cases, the framework, issues,
alternatives, interests requiring accommodation, and potential accommoda-
tions are known. If the treaty is not concluded in 1975, the chances for
agreement will decline sharply. The passage of this psychological dead-
line is likely to weaken resistance to unilateral action, and such action-
and the reactions to it-would seriously complicate further negotiations.
Thus, states must now negotiate on the hard issues. To do this, they must
avoid individual or regional decisions that do not have the necessary flexi-
bility to achieve a comprehensive and widely acceptable treaty. The time
for bargaining positions has passed.
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